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We analyze the security of quantum cryptography schemes for d-level systems using two and
d + 1 maximally conjugated bases under the optimal individual eavesdropping attack. We consider
the most general situation in which classical advantage distillation protocols are used, allowing
for key extraction even in situations where the mutual information between the honest parties is
smaller than the eavesdropper’s information. Advantage distillation protocols are shown to be as
powerful as quantum distillation: key distillation is possible using classical techniques if and only if
the corresponding state in the entanglement based protocol is distillable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography (QC) is a physically secure
protocol to distribute a secret key between two autho-
rized partners, Alice and Bob, at distant locations [1].
Its security is based on the no-cloning theorem: if Alice
encodes the correlation in the state of a d-dimensional
quantum system (qudit) that she sends to Bob, an eaves-
dropper Eve cannot extract any information without in-
troducing errors. By estimating a posteriori the errors in
their correlations, Alice and Bob can detect the presence
of the spy on the line. Of course, zero error can never
be achieved in practice, even in the absence of Eve. By
continuity, we know that if the error is \small" then it
will still be possible to extract a secret key from the noisy
data. At the other extreme, if the error is large, then Eve
could have obtained \too much" information, so the only
way for Alice and Bob to guarantee security is to stop
the protocol and wait for better times. It becomes then
important to quantify the amount of error that can be
tolerated on the Alice-Bob channel: this value measures
the robustness of a QC protocol.
The problem of the extraction of a secret key from
noisy data is of course not specic of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD). Actually, when Alice, Bob and Eve
have processed their quantum states, i.e. after the basis
(or set) reconciliation, they share N independent realiza-
tions of a triple (a; b; e) of classical random variables, dis-
tributed according to some probability law, P (A;B;E).
The variables a and b are both d-valued, we say that Al-
ice and Bob encode their information in dits. Without
loss of generality, we can suppose that Eve has already
processed her data to obtain the optimal guesses for the
values of a and b, so that e = (ea; eb), with ex the d-valued
guess for x. From P , one can in particular calculate the
mutual information:
I(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(AB) ; (1)
I(A : E) = H(A) +H(EA)−H(AEA) ; (2)
I(B : E) = H(B) +H(EB)−H(BEB) ; (3)
where H is the Shannon entropy, measured in dits, e.g.
H(A) = −Pd−1k=0 P (a = k) logd P (a = k).
To extract a secret key from the raw data means that
Alice and Bob are able to process their data and com-
municate classically in order to end with n < N real-
izations of new variables (a0; b0; e0) such that asymptoti-
cally I(A0 : B0) = 1, and I(A0 : E0) = I(B0 : E0) = 0.
In other words, the processed variables must be dis-
tributed according to a probability law P 0 of the form
P 0(A0; B0)P 0(E), with P 0(a0 = b0) = 1. To date, no nec-
essary and sucient criterion is known to decide whether
a secret key can be extracted from a given classical dis-
tribution P (A;B;E). Basically two results are known:
CK criterion. If I(A : B) > IE = min[I(A : E); I(B :
E)], then a secret key of length n = [I(A : B) − IE ]N
can be extracted using one-way classical data processing.
This theorem, given by Csiszar and Ko¨rner in 1978 [2],
formalizes the intuitive idea that if Eve has less informa-
tion than Bob on Alice’s string (or, than Alice on Bob’s
string), the extraction of a secret key is possible.
AD criterion. Even if I(A : B)  IE however, in
some cases a secret key between Alice and Bob can be
extracted. This is because (i) Eve has made some errors,
her information is not one and (ii) Alice and Bob share
a classical authenticated and error-free channel: in other
words, Eve can listen to the classical communication but
can neither modify nor even disturb it. These protocols
were introduced in 1993 by Maurer [3], who called them
advantage distillation protocols. They require two-way
communication between Alice and Bob, are very ine-
cient and no optimal procedure is known.
Most of the works of QC dene robustness by using
CK. AD was introduced in QC a few years ago by Gisin
and Wolf [4], who studied the case of qubit encoding
(d = 2). In this paper, we consider QC protocols with
d-level quantum states or qudits [5]. In Section II, we re-
view these protocols and Eve’s optimal individual attack
on them. We also present the entanglement based version
of all these protocols. Indeed, although entanglement is
in principle not required for a secure key distribution, it
is known that any QKD protocol can be easily translated
into an analogous entanglement based protocol. In Sec-
tion III, we generalize the result of Gisin and Wolf to the
case of qudits: we show that classical advantage distilla-
tion works for d-level protocols if and only if the quantum
state shared by Alice and Bob before the measurement
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in the corresponding entanglement based protocol is en-
tangled and distillable. In Section IV, we discuss the link
between the CK criterion and the violation of Bell’s in-
equalities, noticed for qubits in Refs [6{8]. Section V is
a conclusion, in which we review some interesting open
questions.
II. QC WITH QUDITS
A. The protocol
A general scheme for QC with qudits, generalizing
BB84 protocol for qubits [9], has been presented by Cerf
et al. [5]. Central to this development is the notion of mu-
tually unbiased bases: two bases B1 =
jki} and B2 =jli} are called unbiased (or maximally conjugated) if
jhkjlij2 = 1d for all vectors in each basis. For qudits, one
can nd at most d + 1 maximally conjugated bases [10].
Once a computational basis B1 =
j0i; j1i; :::; jd− 1i} is
arbitrarily chosen, one can always construct at least one






Let B = B1; :::; Bn}, with 2  n  d + 1, a set of
n mutually unbiased bases, where B1 is chosen as the
computational basis. Alice prepares at random one state
belonging to one of these bases and sends it to Bob. Bob
receives the qudit, and measure it in one of the bases of
the set B. Then, (i) if Alice and Bob use the same basis,
their results are perfectly correlated; (ii) if they use dif-
ferent bases, their results are totally uncorrelated. Later,
they reveal publicly the basis that they used: they keep
the items where they used the same basis and discard the
others. So, after this sifting procedure, Alice and Bob are
left with a fraction 1n of the raw list. In the absence of
any disturbance, and in particular in the absence of Eve,
these dits are perfectly correlated.
It is straightforward to construct the corresponding en-







keeps one qudit and sends the other to Bob. The maxi-
mally entangled state is maximally correlated in all the
bases, since for all unitary operations U 2 SU(d),
(U ⊗ U)ji = ji : (6)
After the state distribution, Alice and Bob measure at
random in one of the bases of B (more precisely Bob’s set
of bases is B). They announce the measurement bases.
Only those symbols where they chose the same basis are
accepted, giving a list of perfectly correlated dits. Note
that Alice’s measurement outcome is completely equiva-
lent to the previous state preparation.
For the rest of the article, and for consistency in the
presentation, we will mainly concentrate on entanglement
based protocols. But it has to be stressed that some of
the ideas are especially meaningful for protocols without
entanglement. For instance, whenever we speak about
classical key distillation protocols, we also refer to proto-
cols without entanglement.
B. Generalities about Eve’s attacks
Now we must study Eve’s attacks on the qudit trav-
elling to Bob. Eve makes the incoming qudit interact
in a suitable way with some quantum system she has
prepared in a reference state jRi; then lets the qudit go
to Bob and stores her system. When Alice reveals the
bases, Eve performs the measurement that gives her the
largest information. Thus, after Eve’s intervention, the
total quantum state reads
jΨiABE =
(
1 A ⊗ UBE
 jiAB ⊗ jRiE : (7)
The fact that P (A;B;E) arises from the measurements
of Alice, Bob and Eve on the respective quantum sys-
tems has already some consequences. First of all, the
no-cloning theorem implies that if I(A : B) = 1 then
I(A : E) = I(B : E) = 0. By continuity, this implies
that if I(A : B) is close enough to 1, it will be possible to
extract a secret key. Moreover, H(A) = 1 since Eve does
not modify the local density matrix A = 1d1 of Alice.
We also focus on attacks such that Eve introduces the
same amount of error in all bases: P (a 6= bjBi)  D for
all i = 1; :::; j. Indeed, it was proven in [13] that, given
an asymmetric eavesdropping strategy, one can always
design a symmetric attack as powerful as it. The mutual
information Alice-Bob is thus simply
I(A : B) = 1−H(fD; 1−Dg) : (8)
To go further, one must nd Eve’s optimal attack. Since
Eve can gain more information by introducing larger er-
rors, it is natural to optimize Eve’s attack conditioned
to a xed amount of error D in the correlations Alice-
Bob. This implies that, after optimization, P (A;B;E)
is ultimately only a function of D, and the condition for
Alice and Bob to extract a secret key will be of the form
D < D, for a bound D to be calculated. We stress again
that any QC protocol is secure, because if Alice and Bob
nd D  D, they simply stop the protocol. The value of
D does not quantify the security, but the robustness of
the protocol. It D turns out to be very small, the QKD
protocol is not practical. According to whether we use
the CK or the AD criterion to quantify the robustness,
we shall nd two dierent robustness bounds, DCK and
DAD, with of course DCK  DAD.
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The question is: which quantity should we \optimize"?
It is commonly accepted that we must maximize the mu-
tual information Alice-Eve I(A : E) and/or Bob-Eve
I(B : E) | it will turn out that the optimal incoher-
ent eavesdropping yields I(A : E) = I(B : E). We fol-
low this denition, although, as one of the conclusions
of this work, it will be stressed that dierent optimiza-
tions are worth exploring. Even if now the problem of
nding Eve’s optimal attack is formulated in a precise
way, the optimal attack is still not easy to nd; actu-
ally, to date, only individual attacks (that is, strategies
in which Eve does not attack coherently several qudits)
could be optimized. The next subsection describes the
optimal individual eavesdropping.
C. Optimal individual eavesdropping
Following Cerf et al. [5], we consider only 2-bases pro-
tocols, choosing the two basis as Fourier-dual of one an-
other, and (d + 1)-bases protocols [14]. These are the
natural generalizations, respectively, of the BB84 [9] and
of the six-state [15] protocols for two qubits.
The evolution induced by Eve’s action is built using
the cloning machines introduced in Ref. [16]. The ref-
erence state for Eve is the maximally entangled state of







m,njiAB U (E2)m,−njiE1E2 (9)
where Um,n is the unitary operation that acts on the
computational basis as
jki −! e2piikn/dj(k +m)mod di : (10)
In other words, Umn introduces a phase shift measured
by n and an index shift measured by m. The coecients
am,n are determined by imposing the requirements dis-
cussed above (same amount of errors for all bases), and
then optimizing Eve’s information for a given error D.
We write F = 1 − D the delity of the cryptography
protocol. For the 2-bases protocol, one nds
a0,0 = F ;
am,0 = a0,n  x =
q
F (1−F )
d−1 for m;n 6= 0 ;
am,n  y = 1−Fd−1 for m;n 6= 0 :
(11)
For the (d+ 1)-bases protocol, one nds




am,n  z =
q
1−F
d(d−1) for m 6= 0 or n 6= 0.
(12)
Note that the states jBm,ni = [1 ⊗ Um,n]ji are mutu-
ally orthogonal | in fact, they form a basis of maximally




jam,n(F )j2 jBm,nihBm,nj : (13)
The transformation dened by (9) can be seen as a
cloning machine, where Bob’s state is the state to be
copied, the rst qudit of Eve, E1, is Eve’s clone, and
her second qudit E2 is the ancilla. For both 2-bases and
(d+1)-bases protocols, the information that Eve can gain
by measuring her two qudits has been discussed in Ref.
[5]. It turns out that (I) the measurement on E1 gives the
estimate ea for Alice’s dit; (II) the measurement on E2
gives deterministically the value of the error introduced
on Bob’s side,  = b− a.
We stress that these individual attacks are proved to
be optimal only for d = 2, with two [7] and three bases
[15], and d = 3 and four bases [17]. For larger d, they are
optimal under the assumption that Eve’s best strategy
consists in using one of the cloning machines described
above; this assumption seems plausible but has not been
proved.
We have presently collected all the tools we need to
study the robustness boundsDAD (Section III) andDCK
(Section IV) on QC protocols with entangled qudits.
III. ADVANTAGE DISTILLATION AND
DISTILLATION OF ENTANGLEMENT
In this Section, we prove the following
Theorem: Let DAD and DED define the two bounds:
(i) a secret key can be extracted by advantage distilla-
tion for D < DAD, and (ii) AB(F ) is distillable for
D = 1 − F < DED. Then, for any d, and for both the
2-bases and the the (d+ 1)-bases protocols,
DAD = DED : (14)
In words: advantage distillation protocols can be used to
extract a secret key if and only if the state AB (13) is
entangled and distillable.
Actually, we have rigorous proofs for the 2-bases and
d+1- bases protocol with d = 2 (this was already known
[4]) and d = 3. For d > 3, the validity of the theorem is
conjectured (see below).
The meaning of this result is schematized in Fig. 1.
We start with a quantum state jΨiABE , and want to
end up with a probability distribution P (A;B)P (E) with
P (a = b) = 1. In the Introduction, we considered
the following protocol: (i) the state is measured, giv-
ing P (A;B;E); (ii) Alice and Bob process their classical
data, using AD, to factor Eve out. Let us again em-
phasize here that no entanglement is actually required
for distributing the probabilities P (A;B;E). But one
can as well consider quantum privacy amplification: (i’)
Alice and Bob distill a maximally entangled state ji,
and since pure state entanglement is \monogamous" Eve
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is certainly factored out; (ii’) They make the measure-
ments on ji, and obtain the secret key. Our Theorem
thus means that these two protocols work up to exactly
the same amount of error D. In other words, as far as
robustness is concerned, there seem to be no need for












FIG. 1. Diagram illustrating the meaning of (14): the two protocols \measure the state, then apply advantage distillation"
and \distill the entanglement, then measure the state" work up to the same amount of error in the correlations Alice-Bob.
The proof of the Theorem is given in three steps:
Step 1 (subsection III A): we calculate DED at which
AB ceases to be distillable. We also prove | for all the
(d + 1)-bases protocols, and numerically for the 2-bases
protocol up to d = 6 | that AB becomes separable at
that point, that is, for no value of D the state AB is
bound entangled.
Step 2 (subsection III B): we construct an advantage
distillation protocol that works for all D < DED, so that
DAD  DED.
One would be tempted to say that these two steps con-
clude the proof of (14), taking into account the following
result [18,19]: If jΨiABE is such that AB is separable,
then, whatever Alice and Bob do, there exist a measure-
ment of Eve such that the intrinsic information Alice-
Bob
I(A : B # E) = inf
E! E
I(A : Bj E) (15)
goes to zero. In fact, the vanishing of the intrinsic in-
formation implies that no secret key can be extracted
[18,19]. Indeed, this result would conclude the proof of
the Theorem provided that Eve’s measurement after the
optimal attack (9) gives her the information for which the
intrinsic information vanishes. This sounds very plausi-
ble, but must be proved. That is why we need the third
step:
Step 3 (subsection III C): again, for the (d + 1)-bases
and 2-bases protocol with d = 3, we construct explicitly
the channel E ! E that Eve must apply to her data in
order to obtain I(A : Bj E) = 0. For the 2-bases protocol
and d = 2, the channel was given in Ref. [19].
A. Step 1: Entanglement distillation
We want to prove that for both 2-bases and (d + 1)-
bases protocols, the entanglement of AB is distillable if
and only if
hjAB(F )ji > 1
d
: (16)
This condition is sucient for distillability [20]. To
prove its necessity, we prove that the partial transpose of
AB(F ) becomes positive (more precisely, non-negative)
exactly for the value of F such that hjAB(F )ji = 1d .
It is well-known that a state with positive partial trans-
pose (PPT) is not distillable [21].
1. (d + 1)-bases protocols
Inserting (12) into (13), we nd that for the (d + 1)-
bases protocols the state of Alice and Bob after Eve’s
attack is simply
AB(F ) =  jihj+ (1 − ) 1
d2
(17)
with  = v2 − z2 = dF−1d−1 . The smallest eigenvalue of
the partial transpose TAAB is simply min = (− 1d )+(1−
) 1d2 =
1−(d+1)λ
d2 , where − 1d is the minimal eigenvalue of
(jihj)TA . The partial transpose TAAB is non-negative if
min  0, that is if   1d+1 or equivalently F  2d+1 .
This is precisely the range of value of F for which (16)
does not hold. We have thus proved that:




Moreover, a state of the form (17) cannot be bound-
entangled, i.e. the positivity of its partial transposition
is equivalent to separability [20].
2. 2-bases protocols
Inserting (11) into (13), and noticing that x2 = Fy,
we nd that for the 2-bases protocols the state of Alice
and Bob after Eve’s attack is
AB(F ) = (F 2 − y2) jihj + y2 1 +









where Pm,n = jBm,nihBm,nj, and recall that y = 1−Fd−1 .
In the computational product basis we have:
d hk kjAB(F )jk ki = F
d hk k0jAB(F )jk k0i = y
d hk kjAB(F )jk0 k0i = F (F − y)
d hk k0jAB(F )jj j0i = y(F − y) (k−k0),(j−j0)
(20)
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where k; k0; j; j0 2 f0; 1; :::; d − 1g, k0 6= k and j 6= k.
Note that for F = F it holds y = F (F − y), that is
hk k0jAB( F )jk k0i = hk kjAB( F )jk0 k0i
Condition (16) is fullled for F > F = 1p
d
, so certainly
DED  1− 1p
d
. Now we should prove that strict equality
holds, by proving that AB( F ) is PPT. For d = 2, that
is for the entanglement version of the BB84 protocol, the
calculation is particularly simple and it has been proved
in [4]. Note that because for two qubits the negativity
of the partial transpose is necessary and sucient con-
dition for entanglement, AB( F ) is also separable. For
d > 3 we have demonstrated numerically (see Appendix
A) that AB( F ) is indeed PPT. So we can conclude




For d = 3; : : : ; 6, we can numerically prove (see Appendix
B) that AB( F ) is separable too.
B. Step 2: Advantage distillation protocol
We turn now to prove that advantage distillation works
for all D < DED. This can be done by generalizing the
advantage distillation protocol described in Ref. [4] for
qubits. It works as follows: Alice wants to establish the
secret dit X with Bob. She considers N items of her
list, fai1 ; :::; aiN g, and sends to Bob on the public chan-
nel the list fi1; :::; iNg and the numbers f~aikg such that
aik + ~aik = X . Bob takes the corresponding symbols
of his list, fbi1 ; :::; biNg and calculates bik + ~aik . If he
nds the same result Y for all k, he noties to Alice that
the dit is accepted; otherwise, both discard the N sym-
bols. This protocol shows the features that we discussed
for advantage distillation protocols: it requires two-way
communication (Alice must announce and Bob must con-
rm), and its yield is very low with increasing N . As far
as Eve is concerned, she can only listen to the communi-
cation and compute from her list ~eik = eik + ~aik . If Bob
accepts, she cannot do better than a majority guess.
Now, recall the purpose we want to achieve: we start
in a situation in which I(A : E) = I(B : E) is larger
than I(A : B), and we want to reverse this situation in
order to enter the region in which the much more e-
cient one-way protocols can be used. Thus, we want to
show that, after running the above protocol with N su-
ciently large, the much shorter lists of dits are such that
Bob’s error N in guessing Alice’s dit has become smaller
than Eve’s error N (noted γN in [4]). So now we must
estimate N and N .
Bob accepts a dit when either all his symbols are
identical to those of Alice, which happens with proba-
bility FN , or all his symbols are dierent from Alice’s
by the same amount, which happens with probability





. Thus, the probability of Bob










Note that in the limit of large N the previous expression
becomes an equality.
It is more tricky to obtain an estimate for N . When
Bob accepts a symbol, Eve makes a majority guess. Of
course, there are enormously many possibilities for Eve
to guess wrongly, and it would be very cumbersome to
sum up all of them. The idea is rather to nd those errors
that are the most frequent ones. We shall obtain a bound
N which is smaller than the true one, but very close to it
for large N (equal when N !1). The estimate is based
on the following idea: before the advantage distillation
protocol, Eve is strongly correlated with Alice and Bob.
On the one hand, this implies that when one symbol is
more frequent than all the others in Eve’s processed ~E
list, it will almost always be the correct one. On the other
hand, it is very improbable that three or more symbols
appear with the same frequency in the ~E list. All in all,
the dominating term for Eve’s errors should be associ-
ated to the case where two symbols appear in ~E with the
same frequency, in which case Eve guesses wrongly half
of the times.
Suppose then that two symbols x and x0 appear M
times in ~E, and all the other d − 2 symbols appear
M 0 = N−2Md−2 . Suppose now that one of the two symbols
is the good one: this is highly probable when M > M 0,
and a situation in which M 0 > M is very unlikely to hap-
pen. Moreover, we suppose that aik = bik = x (the other
situation, aik = bik +c = x, adds only corrections of order
N ). The probability that ~E contains M times x and x0






 is the probability that Eve guesses correctly Bob’s dit,
conditioned to the fact that Alice’s and Bob’s dits are
equal. As we said, half of the times Eve will guess x
correctly, and half of the times she will guess x0 wrongly.
Adding the combinatorial factor that counts all the pos-
sible ways of distributing x and x0 among the d symbols

















and applying Stirling’s approximation (x!)m ’ (mx)!mmx we












with k some positive constant. Comparing this expres-
sion with (22), we see that N decreases exponentially
faster than N whenever
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d− 1 + (d− 2)
1− 
d− 1 : (25)
The value of  is found reading through Ref. [5]. For
the 2-bases protocol, the probability that Eve guesses
correctly is independent of the correlation Alice-Bob, so











F (1− F )(d− 1) : (26)
For the (d+ 1)-bases protocols, d+1 = (F + FE − 1)=F ,
where FE = 1− d−1d (v − z)2. Inserting these values into
(25), we nd after some algebra that the condition is sat-
ised precisely for D < DED given by (21), resp. (18).
Thus, our advantage distillation protocol works at least
up to DED.
C. Step 3: Intrinsic information at D = DED for d = 3
We want to prove that the intrinsic information Alice-
Bob goes to zero at D = DED. We shall give the com-
plete proof only for d = 3, but we start with general
considerations.
After basis reconciliation, Alice, Bob and Eve share the
probability distribution P (a; b; ea; ), that can be found
reading through Ref. [5] | recall that  = b − a deter-
ministically. For the 2-bases protocol, we have:
P (a; b = a; ea = a; 0) = F FE=d
P (a; b = a; ea 6= a; 0) = F DE=d
P (a; b 6= a; ea = a; b− a) = DFE=d
P (a; b 6= a; ea 6= a; b− a) = DDE=d :
(27)
For (d+1)-bases protocols, writing  = (F +FE − 1)=F ,
we have:
P (a; b = a; ea = a; 0) = F =d
P (a; b = a; ea 6= a; 0) = F (1−λd−1 )=d
P (a; b 6= a; ea = a; b− a) = D=d
P (a; b 6= a; ea 6= a; b− a) = 0 :
(28)
For both these distributions, the conditional mutual in-
formation is I(A : BjE) 6= 0. We are looking for a classi-
cal channel C that Eve could apply to her information
C : E = f(ea; )g ! E = fug (29)
in such a way that I(A : Bj E) = 0 [22]. The channel is
dened by the probabilities C(ujea; ) that the symbol
(ea; ) of E is sent onto the symbol u of E. Of course,
these probabilities fulll the condition
P
u C(ujea; ) =
1. The new probability distribution for Alice, Bob and
Eve is given by
P (a; b; u) =
X
ea,chi
C(ujea; )P (a; b; ea; ) ; (30)
whence conditional probabilities P (a; bju) are obtained
in the usual way.
At this stage, we know of no systematic way of nd-
ing the channel that minimizes I(A : Bj E), so we shall
try to describe our intuition. Basically, one must keep in
mind that I(A : Bj E) = 0 if and only if P (a; bju) is in
fact the product probability P (aju)P (bju). In particular,
identities like
P (a; bju)P (a0; b0ju) = P (a; b0ju)P (a0; bju) (31)
should hold for all values of the symbols.
For d = 3, we tried the \simplest" form of the chan-
nel and veried that it gives indeed I(A : Bj E) = 0 for
D = DED. It is dened as follows:
 The symbol E is a trit:
E = fu0; u1; u2g : (32)
 When Eve has introduced no error ( = 0), Eve’s
guess is sent deterministically on the corresponding
value of the trit:
C(ukjea;  = 0) = k,ea : (33)
 When Eve has introduced some errors, Eve’s
guesses are mixed according to the following rule:
C(ukjea;  6= 0) = c ; k 6= ea − 1− 2c ; k = ea −  : (34)
The value of the parameter c was found on the computer.
For the 2-bases protocol, we found c  0:4715; for the 4-
bases protocol, c  0:4444.
IV. THE CK BOUND AND THE VIOLATION OF
BELL’S INEQUALITIES
As we said, although strictly speaking a secret key can
be extracted forD < DAD, in practice the extraction can
be made efficiently only for D < DCK , and this criterion
is the most studied in the literature. The value of DCK
for the protocols we are considering is given in Ref. [5].










For the (d+ 1)-bases protocols, it is cumbersome to give
a closed formula for DCKd+1, but it can be veried that this
is slightly larger than DCK2 : in other words, (d+1)-bases
protocols are more robust than 2-bases protocols also if
one considers the CK bound.
We saw in the previous Section that DAD = DED: ad-
vantage distillation is tightly linked to entanglement dis-
tillation. The bound DCK seems to be linked with the
violation of a Bell’s inequality, but it is unclear whether
this link is as tight as (14), because it is a hard problem
to characterize all the Bell’s inequalities. More precisely,
the state-of-the-question is described by the following
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Statement: Define the two bounds: (i) I(A : B) >
min

I(A : E); I(B : E)

for D < DCK , and (ii) AB(F )
violates a Bell’s inequality for D = 1−F < DBell. Then,
for any d, for both the 2-bases and the the (d + 1)-bases
protocols, and for all known Bell inequalities, it holds
DBell  DCK : (35)
In words: if the state AB violates a Bell’s inequality,
then certainly the correlations can be used to extract a
secret key in an ecient way. This is one of the situations
in which Bell’s inequalities show themselves as witnesses
of useful entanglement [23].
We start with a review of the d = 2 case, because even
though these results are known [6,7,15], the full calcu-
lation has never been presented in detail. In the intro-
ductory paragraphs of Refs [8], the detailed argument
was given, but in the case where Eve uses the so-called
Niu-Griths cloning machine [24]. This attack gives the
same I(A : E) as the optimal one considered here, but
I(B : E) < I(A : B) for all values of D, so strictly speak-
ing there is no DCK [25].
Consider rst the 2-bases protocol. Writing as usual
ji = 1p
2
(j00i  j11i) and jΨi = 1p
2
(j01i  j10i), the













tk(F )k ⊗ k

(36)
with tx = tz = 2F − 1 and ty = −(2F − 1)2. Apply-
ing the Horodeckis’ result [26], the expectation value for
the CHSH-Bell operator [27] with the optimal settings is
given by S =
p
t2x + t2z = (2F − 1)
p
2. The Bell inequal-




is again for D < DBell = 12 (1 − 1p2 ) = DCK . So for the
qubit protocol the equality holds in (35).
This seems to be no longer true when we move to the
3-bases protocol (six-states protocol). The state (17) has
the same form as (36), with tx = tz = −ty = 2F − 1.
The condition for the violation of the CHSH-Bell inequal-
ity is then exactly the same as before, so we nd again
DBell = 12 (1 − 1p2 ). But for the six-states protocol, the
bound DCK is slightly larger than this value.
One might start questioning the choice of the inequal-
ity. In the CHSH inequality [27], Alice and Bob choose
each among two possible settings. For this reason, the in-
equality seems suited for the 2-bases protocol (although
the settings are not the same ones), while for the 3-bases
protocol one should nd an inequality with three settings
per qubit. The existence of a two-qubit inequality with
three settings per side more robust than the CHSH is
an interesting open question, although some numerical
results suggest that there is no such an inequality [28].
Moving now to the d > 2 case, the knowledge is even
more vague. Good Bell’s inequalities for two entangled
qudits for d > 2 have been found only recently [29,30].
When applied to our problem, all these inequalities give
DBell < DCK both for the 2-bases and the (d+ 1)-bases
protocols. Again, one can hope to nd other inequali-
ties, although the inequality with two settings per qudit
of Collins et al. [29] is in some sense optimal [31].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have studied the relation between
quantum and classical distillation protocols for quantum
cryptography. We have shown that for the schemes using
two and d + 1 bases, classical and quantum key distilla-
tion protocols work up to the same point or disturbance,
under the optimal individual eavesdropping attack. We
would like to conclude the present work with a list of
several open questions connected to many of the points
raised here. The solution of any of them will provide more
insight into the relation between classical and quantum
distillation techniques for quantum key distribution.
 The rst open question is of course the validity of
the conjecture that the cloning machines dened
above provide really the optimal eavesdropping,
also for d > 3. While this seems very plausible
for the (d+ 1)-bases protocols, also when the The-
orem (14) of this paper is taken into account, some
doubts can be raised for the 2-bases protocols. In
these protocols, the second basis has always been
dened as the Fourier-dual basis of the computa-
tional basis. For d = 2 and d = 3 this is not a
restriction, since the following holds: for any B1,
B2 and B3 mutually maximally conjugated bases,
there exist a unitary operation that sends the pair
(B1; B2) onto the pair (B1; B3). For eavesdrop-
ping on QC, this means that the cloning machines
C12 and C13 that are optimized for, respectively,
(B1; B2) and (B1; B3), are equivalent under a uni-
tary operation, so in particular have the same -
delity and dene the same bounds. For d > 3
however, it is in general impossible to link (B1; B2)
to (B1; B3) with a unitary operation. This opens
some intriguing possibilities: for instance, it might
turn out that some pairs of mutually conjugated
bases are more dicult to clone than others, and
are therefore more suitable for cryptography.
 In Section III, we have shown that two protocols
for extracting a secret key, namely \Measurement
followed by advantage distillation" and \Entangle-
ment Distillation followed by measurement", work
up to the same error rate. However, one of these
two strategies might turn out to have a better yield
than the other one. This is a complicated prob-
lem since, for both advantage distillation and en-
tanglement distillation, the optimal protocols are
not known.
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 The last important open question concerns the
choice of Eve’s strategy. As mentioned explicitly,
we have always supposed in this paper | as is done,
to our knowledge, in all papers on QC | that Eve’s
best individual attack is the one that maximizes
Eve’s information at any given error rate induced
on the correlations Alice-Bob. But Eve might have
a dierent purpose; for instance, since after all the
security of QC cannot be beaten, she might be will-
ing to decrease the robustness. It is an open ques-
tion whether the attacks that maximize Eve’s infor-
mation are also those that dene the lowest possible
robustness bounds.
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APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, we describe the ecient numerical
calculation used to demonstrate that AB( F ) for the 2-
bases protocol is PPT (see paragraph III A 2).
When one resorts to numerical methods, the rst idea
would be to use the brute force of the computer: write
a program that takes AB( F )  , computes TA  M
and nds its minimal eigenvalue. But M is a d2d2 ma-
trix, and since it has a nice structure one can do much
better. Actually, we show below that M actually is bloc-
diagonal, with d blocs of dimension d  d. For odd d,
all the blocs are identical; for even d, two dierent blocs
appear, each in d2 copies. Having noticed that, one has
to nd numerically the minimal eigenvalue of one or two
d d real matrices, and this scales much better than the
brute force method. Based on this result, we could very
easily check that AB( F ) is PPT up to d = 200, this
number having no other meaning than the fact that one
must stop the computation somewhere | anyway, it is
unlikely that a QC protocol using entangled states of two
200-levels systems will ever be of any practical interest.
To study the structure ofM = TAAB, we take the partial
transpose of (20):
hk kjM jk ki = A
hk k0jM jk k0i = B
hk k0jM jk0 ki = B0
hk k0jM jj j0i = C (k+k0),(j+j0)
(37)
with A = Fd , B =
y
d , B
0 = F (F−y)d and C =
y(F−y)
d .
Recall that B = B0 for F = F ; we must prove that
the minimal eigenvalue of M is negative if and only if
B < B0. From (37) it is then clear that M is composed
of d blocs d  d, because these four relations show that
only the hk k0jM jj j0i with k + k0 = j + j0 are non-zero.





















one nds the following structure for M :
odd d: all blocs are identical to0
BBBBB@
A c c ::: c
cT B C ::: C




cT C C ::: B
1
CCCCCA ; (38)
even d: the d2 blocs characterized by k+k
0 even are equal
to 0
BBBB@
A C C ::: C
C B C ::: C




C C C ::: B
1
CCCCA ; (39)
the d2 blocs characterized by k + k
0 odd are equal to
0
BBBB@
B C C ::: C
C B C ::: C




C C C ::: B
1
CCCCA : (40)
So these are the dd matrices whose minimal eigenvalue
is to be found.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we show how to numerically prove the
separability of the states AB( F ) for the 2-bases proto-
col. Note that all the states AB( F ) are diagonal in the
Bell basis fjBm,nig (13). This turns out to be the crucial
point in our demonstration. Indeed, it is very plausible
that PPT is a necessary and also sucient condition for
the separability of Bell diagonal states, but we are not
aware of any proof of that.
Any density matrix, , can be brought into a Bell di-
agonal form by a sequence of local operations assisted
with classical communication (LOCC). This is done by






(Um,n ⊗ U?m,n)(Um,n ⊗ U?m,n)y ; (41)






where m,n = hBm,njjBm,ni. Thus, the overlaps with
the Bell states for the initial and the depolarized state
are the same, they are not changed by D.
We consider a subset of the set of separable pure states
in Cd ⊗ Cd parameterized as
j si = j i ⊗ j i : (43)
Note that these states depend on 2d− 2 parameters, in-
stead of the 2(d− 2) needed for a generic separable pure
state. We look for those j si minimizing the function
f( s) = (jam,n( F )j2 − jhBm,nj sij2)2 : (44)
After some computer runs, we always nd (up to d=6)
a state j  si such that f(  s) = 0, which means that
jhBm,nj  sij = jam,n( F )j. Therefore, after applying the
depolarization protocol to this state, one obtains
AB( F ) = D(j  sih  sj) ; (45)
which means that AB( F ) is separable.
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